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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to explore the connection
between Jonathan Swift, Thomas Hobbes, and the classical
philosophers Epicurus and Lucretius. The literary pieces analyzed
are Lucretius's De Rerum Natura {On the Nature o f Things),
Thomas Hobbes's De Homine and Leviathan, and Swift's letters,
A Tale of a Tub, and Gulliver's Travels.
First, the fundamental ideas of Lucretius are established.
Then, those ideas are compared to the later work of Thomas
Hobbes, and found to serve as a foundation for his works De
Homine and Leviathan. In addition to revealing characteristics
similar to those o f Lucretius, Hobbes introduces his belief that
mankind is neither naturally rational nor innately good, and explains
that in essence it is fear o f one another that prompts men to live in a
society governed by laws.
Jonathan Swift, through his letters, and A Tale o f a Tub
and Gulliver's Travels, addresses the ideas of Hobbes, and as a
result those of Lucretius. Though he professes to despise their
ideas, he in fact reveals himself to be a Hobbist/Lucretian in certain
ironic and important ways. This paradox is the main focus o f the
thesis.

SWIFT’S VEXED SATIRE OF HOBBES AND LUCRETIUS

In the eighteenth century there raged a debate that would leave an indelible mark
on all philosophy of human nature to follow. It revolved around the issue o f the true
nature of man, and it involved two very distinct schools of thought, one insisted that man
was an inherently good being, whose evil actions were a symptom o f being led astray by
the temptations and complications o f a strongly governed society. The other, rooted most
recently in the theories o f Thomas Hobbes, maintained that man was rather a selfish brute
at heart, forced to enter into contract with his fellow beasts to form a society in which he
could live without fear of the terrible ills that would surely befall him in what Hobbes
called "the state o f nature." While some took their beliefs to debating chambers or
coffeehouses, men such as Jonathan Swift took pen in hand and wrote several pieces of
literature that address, if somewhat obliquely, the debate and their position within it. In
his A Tale of a Tub and Gulliver’s Travels. Swift reveals what appears to be a paradox: in
the former work he claims to write specifically against Thomas Hobbes, but in the latter he
appears to subscribe to some of Hobbes's ideas, and to his theories on the nature o f man.
It is this dynamic that invites a study o f the relationship between Thomas Hobbes and
Jonathan Swift. The most effective means o f initiating such an analysis is to become
familiar with Hobbes as Swift would have known him, that is, through his two most
powerful works, Leviathan and De Homine.

I.

Published in 1651 as Thomas Hobbes's culminating achievement in political
science, Leviathan is a seventeenth - century manifesto designed to reveal not only what
man is, but what he ought to be. By first attempting to define man and the motivations
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for his behavior, Hobbes establishes him as little more than an animal whose only priority
is self-preservation. After having done so, he then reveals his theory on the ways in which
a society populated by such creatures generates what he identifies as the artificial man, or
leviathan. Hobbes then elaborates further by explaining that it is this leviathan that gives
birth to the "Commonwealth," and so his logic rests upon a linear connection which binds
man at his most primitive to Mankind and its need for social contracts. The focus
throughout is to prove that such an evolution is the direct result o f man's living within the
atomistic, materialistic, and atheistic universe, as was proposed in a later piece, De
Homine, written in 1658. Man's self - preservation, Hobbes seems to believe, is the fertile
soil in which germinate, alternately, peace and war, sovereignty and religion. From this
soil flourish the societies that must enter into contracts or else be lost again in the State of
Nature. But Hobbes's findings were not wholly original - - nor would Swift have thought
them so. Throughout Leviathan lay the artifacts of an earlier philosophy, namely that
recorded by the Latin poet and Epicurean philosopher Lucretius. Writing between 98 and
55 B.C., Lucretius was a devoted disciple o f the third century B.C. Greek philosopher
Epicurus, whose theories revolved around a therapeutic disbelief in the divine creation and
government, and in the afterlife. Epicurus held that such a suspension of conventional
dogma would allow for the pursuit o f earthly pleasures without fear o f punishment from
the gods while on earth, or o f eternal damnation once dead. In effect, then, Epicurus
made strides to eliminate mystery and fear by replacing them, through science, with logical
explanations for natural phenomena. Lucretius, with these concepts as his foundation,
composed his poem On the Nature o f Things in order to reinforce the Epicurean
explanations for those things about the world that had first inspired men to attribute them
to divinity. Its style and many of its ideas were borrowed by Hobbes. Through a study of
Leviathan and On the Nature o f Thipgs. the Epicurean/Lucretian origins o f Hobbes's
masterpiece becomes quite clear.
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Thomas Hobbes wrote his manifesto under the assumption that it is the desire of
every man to hold dominion and wield power over all other men. This instinct, coupled
with that of self-preservation, leads to the need for sovereign leadership by one person and
a contract, each man with the other, to bind violent hands and greedy natures. In Part I,
Chapter XIII, O f the Naturall Condition o f Mankind, as concerning their Felicity, and

Misery, Hobbes asserts, "in the nature o f man, we find three principall causes o f quarrell.
First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory" (Leviathan, 185). By "nature"
one may assume is meant that all men are bom with a predisposition to quarrel. It is this
predisposition that Hobbes addresses later in the same chapter as he explains that the
"Passions that encline men to Peace, are Feare of Death; Desire of such things as are
necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them" (Leviathan,
188). It is clear that, in Hobbes's opinion, mankind suffers perpetual conflict, both
internal and external; and even the basis for peace is a dynamic tension between our fears
and hopes. In order to maintain a balance between them, and as well ensure a safe
environment in which a society may thrive, Hobbes claims to uncover certain "Lawes of
Nature" which, through science, will in turn yield morality and the generation of the
"Common-Wealth."
The Lex Naturalis, or Law o f Nature, is for Hobbes any rule or precept by which a
man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his own life or the life of another. He is
quick to distinguish the Law o f Nature from the Jus Naturale, or Right of Nature, which,
in giving men equality gives them also equal right to use their own power to do anything
they reason necessary for their own well-being. The law binds, whereas the right permits,
and it is due to the latter that the former must be installed willingly by humanity. Note the
following passage from Leviathan in which Hobbes infers another Lex Naturalis.
From this Fundamentall Law o f Nature, by which
men are commanded to endeavour Peace, is derived
this second Law; That a man be willing, when others
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are so too, asfarre-forth, as for Peace, and
defence o f himselfe he shall think it necessary,
to lay down his right to all things; and be contented
with so much liberty against other men, as he would
allow other men against himselfe. (Leviathan. 190)

These two fundamental Laws of Nature do in fact replace natural liberties - - those of
every man for himself - - with a liberty Hobbes, and humanity, values more - - that of
security. The freedom of killing his neighbor for his silver is now the freedom for a man
to, ideally, leave unlatched the door in the confidence that his neighbor will not kill him for
the same reason. This defines, in Leviathan, a covenant. The covenant, or agreement,
while ideal for the elimination of what Hobbes believes to be the condition of man - - "a
condition o f Warre of every one against every one" (Leviathan, 189) - - cannot go
unmonitored. It is this fact that makes necessary the generation o f Hobbes's "Common
wealth," which he calls as well, "Leviathan."
The meanings of the word "leviathan" are quite varied. Although its origin is
unknown, it had been used before Hobbes to represent a sea monster in Hebrew poetry,
Satan (1595), a man o f vast power or wealth (1607), and anything huge and/or monstrous
(1624). With the publication of Leviathan in 1651, Hobbes was the first to apply it to the
commonwealth as an organism. Past uses of the word, quite negative in meaning, invite
pause to wonder at the author's choice. Does it reflect the commonwealth as a body "of
vast power or wealth," or simply a "monstrous" collection o f beings whose natures may
themselves be so called - - even evil, as the 1595 use suggests? It is obvious that Hobbes
believes man naturally incapable of peace and goodwill, and it is arguable that his title
reflects his disgust with human brutishness. The brutes, however, may be made more
reasonable within the ironically liberating chains of the commonwealth, which itself must
be governed by one man - - the sovereign. Thus Hobbes lets sail his leviathan, with its
masthead the sovereign, thrust forth by the mutual consent of the men within it, kept safe
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by laws and covenant but threatened by the natural instincts o f man to enter into the State
o f Nature, or perpetual warfare, as the following passage implies:
This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is
called a COMMON-WEALTH, in latine CIVITAS.
This is the Generation o f that LEVIATHAN, or rather
(to speake more reverently) of the Mortall
God, to which wee owe under the Immortall
God, our peace and defence. (Leviathan. 227)
In an apology for using the term "Leviathan" in his description of the evolution from the
brutish individual to a society bound by a common leader, Hobbes indicates an awareness
o f the more sinister definitions of the word. It seems not a title to be desired, yet he
identifies it clearly with the "Mortall God" created by men through joining in contract, and
so invites an investigation into its generation and its connection with the "Immortall God '
created, Hobbes will affirm, through the fear o f man. It is here, in philosophy o f religion,
that Lucretius and Hobbes meet, and put forth physical, material evidence to explain away
those mysteries that first caused man to force the unknown into the more secure mold o f a
divine being.
In his Epicurean poem, On the Nature of Things. Lucretius sings o f the success of
his mentor in bringing to mortals equality with the heavens. His method is to regress to
the very beginnings of the world, dissecting creation to reveal a series of physical causes
for its creation; he is able to attribute every mystery of the world to atomism, or
materialism, by which all worldly occurrences can be explained by considering them in
terms o f physical matter and science. From there he moves to the logical results o f the
science he extols, and uses those results to eliminate superstition. In so doing, he also
attempts to put an end to fear of the unknown and, in his polytheistic society, fear o f the
gods, and follows his heroic model, Epicurus:
When human life to view lay foully prostrate upon earth
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crushed down under the weight o f religion, who showed
her head from the quarters of heaven with hideous aspect
lowering upon mortals, a man o f Greece [Epicurus]
ventured first to lift up his mortal eyes to her face and
first to withstand her to her face. Him neither story o f
gods nor thunderbolts nor heaven with threatening roar
could quell: they only chafed the more eager courage of his
soul, filling him with desire to be the first to burst the fast
bars o f nature's portals. Therefore the living force of his
soul gained the day: on he passed far beyond the flaming
walls o f the world and traversed throughout in mind and
spirit the immeasurable universe; whence he returns a
conqueror to tell us what can, what cannot come into
being; in short on what principle each thing has its powers
defined, its deepset boundary mark. Therefore religion is
put under foot and trampled upon in turn; us his victory
brings level with heaven.
(Lucretius, 1. 62-79))

It is religion, Lucretius argues, which has led so many down the path of sin. The terror of
men at not being able to explain a bolt of lightning or the changing of the tides caused
them to attribute all o f creation to the gods. It is the intention o f Lucretius to disprove the
creative power o f these gods by explaining "first - beginnings," or the generation of the
physical world by movements equally physical in nature.
All o f nature is founded on two things: bodies and voids. The joining and
separating o f like bodies causes every element to occur, and those elements have, from the
beginning o f time, combined and moved to make up the world. That fish breathe in water
and suffocate in an environment o f air alone is, for example, a matter o f physics rather
than the hand o f a god. The same logic applies to man. Hobbes reinforces this
atomistic/materialistic idea in a work published in 1658, Dfi Homine. or Concerning Man.
when he writes o f our very emotions that they "consist in various motions o f the blood and
animal spirits" (55) and that the feelings o f glory and shame, as well as the reactions
manifested by weeping and laughter, are all caused by actual movements within the human
frame (58-59). Lucretius addresses the constitution o f man from a purely physical
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perspective, insisting that "the nature o f the mind and soul is bodily" (32). Reason must
admit, continues the poet, that since the soul is bodily, the death o f the body is also the
death of the soul. A dead soul will therefore have no afterlife - - no punishment or praise - nothing to fear. Rather, the punishment consists o f a life on earth full o f the unnecessary
fear and guilt created out o f man's self-imposed religious dogma, as Lucretius here notes:
But there is in life a dread of punishment for evil
deeds, signal as the deeds are signal, and for atonement
of guilt, the prison and the frightful hurling down from
the rock, scourgings, executioners, the dungeon of the
doomed, the pitch, the metal plate, torches; and even
though these are wanting, yet the conscience-stricken
mind through boding fears applies to itself goads and
frightens itself with whips, and sees not meanwhile
what end there can be o f ills or what limit at last is to
be set to punishments, and fears lest these very evils
be enhanced after death. The life o f fools at length
becomes a hell here on earth. (Lucretius, 1. 1010 -1023)
The gods, then, did not create the world, but men created the gods to account for
the mysteries of it; they did so to allay fear, but ironically only came to fear the gods they
themselves created. Lucretius's irony is that men create religion out o f fear, and so create
for themselves misery. By attempting to prove such an idea as fact, Lucretius lays the
foundations for a new kind of man, one who, with nothing to fear, is free to indulge in
every proper earthly pleasure and delight - - ethically and rightly. The progression from
the physical to the scientific to the ethical is made clear: science has disproved the
existence of a higher power and so, logically, man no longer need adhere to a code of
ethics founded upon it.
Thomas Hobbes addresses the same issue as that o f Lucretius mentioned above in
Leviathan; Part I, Chapter XII, O f Religion. Noting that man is the only being in which
the signs of religion may be observed, Hobbes concludes that the seeds o f religion are
solely within him as well. In the notes that accompany the text in its margins, he continues
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to summarize the characteristics peculiar to man, namely "his desire o f Knowing causes,
[his] consideration o f the Beginning o f things, [and] his observation o f the Sequell of
things," which predispose him to create a divine explanation for that which he cannot
comprehend (Leviathan, 168-169). "The naturall Cause of Religion," he concludes, is "the
Anxiety o f the time to come" (Leviathan. 169). The reflection of Lucretius here is
unmistakable, and the following passage from Leviathan further explains man's "perpetuall
feare" bom o f his own creation:
For being assured that there be causes of all things that
have arrived hitherto, or shall arrive hereafter; it is
impossible for a man, who continually endeavoureth
to secure himselfe against the evill he
feares, and procure the good he desireth, not to
be in a perpetuall solicitude of the time to come; So
that every man, especially those that are over
provident, are in an estate like that of Prometheus.
For as Prometheus (which interpreted, is, The prudent
man,) was bound to the hill Caucasus, a place o f large
prospect, where, an Eagle feeding on his liver, de
voured in the day, as much as was repayred in the
night: So that man, which looks too far before him, in
the care of future time, hath his heart all the day
long, gnawed on by feare of death, poverty, or other
calamity; and has no repose, nor pause o f his anxiety, but
in sleep.
(Leviathan. 169)

Though Hobbes's use o f a classical, polytheistic figure such as Prometheus alludes to a
time well before that o f Lucretius, it nevertheless calls him to mind, and his ideas with him.
Hobbes reaches into the past and finds men have not changed. His desire to know the
causes of that which goes on around him and a fear o f the unknown future are to Hobbes,
as well as his Epicurean ancestor, the causes of religion. In terms of the effect of religion
on the commonwealth, Hobbes suggests that those first founders o f it maintained fear in
order to maintain peace, and so intertwined government with religion.
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The two philosophers also share a common belief regarding the nature o f man.
Both see him as a being intent on his own advancement at any cost, tempered only by his
realization that all men have such intent for themselves, and that the safety of their
society - - and, therefore, o f themselves - - demands its sacrifice. Lucretius expresses
this clearly in the passage below:

But men desired to be famous and powerful,
in order that their fortunes might rest on a firm
foundation and they might be able by their
wealth to lead a tranquil life; but in vain, since in
their struggle to mount up to the highest
dignities they rendered their path one full of
danger; and even if they reach it, yet envy like a
thunderbolt sometimes strikes and dashes men
down from the highest point with ignominy into
noisome Tartarus... so that far better it is to obey
in peace and quiet than to wish to rule with
power supreme and be the master of
kingdoms.
(Lucretius, 1. 1123-1138)

And here:
For mankind, tired out with a life of brute force,
lay exhausted from its feuds; and therefore the
more readily it submitted o f its own freewill to
laws and stringent codes.
(Lucretius, 1. 1148-1151)

Such ideas echo back and forth between Lucretius and Hobbes. For both, science and
reason explain needs and the progression of events. As a result, the mystery once
associated with creation is banished, and the philosophers proceed to design a new system
o f ethics based on purely physical foundations. This conclusion, then, allows one to
approach the eighteenth century, and Jonathan Swift, whose Tale of a Tub is deliberately
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and explicitly framed as a response to Leviathan (and so to Lucretius), with a greater
understanding of the origin and history o f the ideas with which he takes issue.

Woven from the rich fibers o f allegory and digression, Jonathan Swift's A Tale of a
Tub, first published in 1704, is a masterful satire of the zealous tenets o f eighteenthcentury modernism. In it the reader encounters everything from the arguments between
ancients and modems, to a treatise on the beneficial characteristics of madness, to an
imaginative retelling of Christian history. Its subject matter, in short, is varied and
motley - - a seemingly stream-of-consciousness record o f its author's colorful and often
contradictory opinions. Still, while various tangents and non sequiturs may lead the
reader to his or her own confusion, the work itself, and indeed its strange style and
construction, serve a distinct and clear purpose - -to lay to rest two fundamental
Epicurean principles that led to Hobbes's Leviathan and works like it. The first, espoused
by Lucretius, is that every occurrence, be it earthly or supernatural, is explicable through
physical materialism and the movements and combinations of atoms. Indeed, this is the
fundamental lesson o f Hobbes's earlier work, De Homine. As previously discussed, such
extreme focus on the physical nature o f the world provided for the Epicurean a system of
disbelief in forces divine. The second principle against which Swift ventures is the
utilitarianism that Hobbes offers as explanation for the common system of ethics
embraced by man. Hobbes removes from the daily lives of men their own reason,
emotion, and free will: it is not because they are rational that they develop laws,
governments, societies; not because they are creative that they produce art, music, and
literature; not because they are naturally sympathetic and warm that they develop
friendships and reproduce families. It is because men have joined in a tacit utilitarian
contract. In De Homine he states that politics and ethics are "the sciences o f the just and
unjust, o f equity and inequity" (42), and that both are accepted because, like friendship,
art, and invention, they are useful (49-50). James Moore identifies the same penchant in
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the work of Epicurus, and so strengthens the connection between Epicurus and Hobbes
within the school o f philosophical skepticism:
Epicurean moralists perceived the virtue o f justice
to be derived from nothing but its utility. "Justice is
nothing in itself," Epicurus said. "Mankind, united in
Society, discovered the Utility and Advantage of
agreeing among themselves."... Epicurus and his
followers observed that, once the laws had curbed
and regulated differences of temperament, it was
possible for some, at least, to live in sympathy with
one another.
(Moore, 29)
It is these two profound and pessimistic principles that Jonathan Swift attempts to
disavow through A Tale o f a Tub. To begin a study o f how Swift accomplishes this
weighty task, it is wisest to first analyze the personality behind the pen; not, as one might
assume, Jonathan Swift himself, but the persona who claims to be the author o f A Tale
of a Tub.

n.
It is difficult to paint a true portrait of the persona in A Tale of a Tub. In his preface
he claims to be "a most devoted Servant of all Modern Forms" (Swift, Writings, 286) and
displays pride at his membership in the Grub Street fraternity. The student of Swift
recognizes immediately that the Dean and the "author" are far from being of one mind.
Quite early in the work it becomes clear that Swift, champion o f the ancient school,
intends to use his modem persona to expose the weaknesses of modernity itself. He
manipulates the persona into countless embarrassments and contradictions, ultimately
discovering him as a madman. Not the least o f his formula for doing so involves the
extreme egoism o f the persona; such self-involvement, combined with what John R. Clark
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calls the urgent "presentness" of modems in general, results in a combination described
well by Clark:

This overwhelming presentness gives the Tale o f a Tub
its atmosphere o f impulsion and colors its modem
author as well with a pervasive egotism. As if in haste,
the Modem always speaks in the first person singular and
always in the present tense, preferably in the progressive
present: "I am now trying an Experiment" ...; "I do
here gladly embrace" ...; "I am now advancing"... ;'I do
here humbly propose" ...; "I proceed to refute" ...
(Clark, 119-120)

Overwhelmingly concerned with only contemporary events and his own place within
them, the persona reveals himself as something of a fool, not unlike the inward-looking
Struldbruggs of Swift's later work, Gulliver's Travels.
At the start o f his writing, the persona claims that his purpose is to produce a
diversion for removing attention from Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan, which he has been
told, and believes, is a danger to the Commonwealth o f England. Recalling that the work
is based upon the theories o f Epicurus, as recorded by Lucretius, it is an interestingly
ironic task to analyze the persona in terms o f Epicurean/Lucretian ideas about man.
Thomas Hobbes distinguishes between two extreme states of mind, sensuality and
fancifulness; the "sensual man" seeks only momentary pleasures o f the senses, which lead
him to "ignore honor or future events and goals, until he becomes progressively less
diligent, less curious, less sensible, withdrawing into himself with a totally inert lassitude
common to many a psychotic" (Clark, 26). In many ways this defines the modem
persona of A Tale o f a Tub: he is merely concerned with his own ideas and schemes, and
slowly "devolves into madness" (Clark, 38), as revealed later in his Digression

concerning the Original, the Use and Improvement o f Madness in a Commonwealth.
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Ironically, that pursuit of momentary sensual pleasure echoes some o f the ideas of
Epicurus, which laid the foundation for Hobbes.
Further, the modem persona personifies Hobbes's idea of the "good wit," which
is defined as the ability to observe similitudes in all things, but, oddly enough, use that
ability without discretion (Leviathan. 135) . As Clark explains, modems "have just such a
fantastical ability to discover metaphysical metaphors in their imaginings - precisely
without method, culture, or instruction" (Clark, 137). In addition, it is interesting to note
the basic stylistic similarities between the persona and Hobbes. Both are masters of
digression, often losing themselves in trains of thought that carry them away from their
intended path. And yet, it must be noted that Hobbes disapproves o f the "sensual man,"
espousing a qualified Epicureanism in its stead (perhaps even ultimately revealing himself
a stoic).
Another characteristic of the modem narrator is his often contradictory manner.
He frequently reverses his own profound claims, and, as Clark notes, "very consciously
seeks to be paradoxical" (Clark, 182). For example, Clark continues, the persona
"declares his ability to write 'On Nothing,' he argues that where his own writing is
incomprehensible, 'it shall be concluded, that something very useful and profound is
coucht underneath'...He praises destructive criticism ... extols digressions ... lauds
madness"(Clark, 182). All o f this he does with the extreme zeal of the most devoted
modem disciple, thereby overturning his own credibility and replacing it with so many
distractions that the reader is hardly surprised when, in Section IX, A Digression

concerning the Original, the Use and Improvement o f Madness in a Commonwealth, he
recommends that every "Student and Professor" in Bedlam be studied for his many talents
and employed in "the several Offices in a state ***** Civil and Military," and that special
consideration be given to this suggestion because he himself "had some Time the
Happiness to be an unworthy Member" of that "honourable Society," Bedlam (Swift,
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353). In effect, then, the persona acknowledges that he is mad, and so his deterioration is
complete.
Having established the persona with whose peculiarities the reader must deal, it is
easier to address the manner and result o f Swift's intentions - - namely to respond to
Hobbes and those o f his materialistic school. The most comprehensive way to do so is to
examine in order of occurrence those references, veiled and obvious, that deal with the
Hobbes/Epicurus/Lucretius issue. The first o f these is found in the very first section of A
Tale of a Tub, An Apology fo r the, &c. In defense of the pages to follow, the "author"
maintains that there is nothing within them by which the Church o f England can be
offended, and that if objections are made, they would be better levied against other works
more in need of criticism:
[The tale] contains nothing to provoke them [clergymen] by the
least Scurillity upon their Persons or their Functions. It
Celebrates the Church of England as the most perfect of
all others in Discipline and Doctrine, it advances no
Opinion they reject, nor condemns any they receive. If
the Clergy's Resentments lay upon their Hands, in my
humble Opinion, they might have found more proper
Objects to employ them on ... I mean those heavy, illiterate
Scriblers, prostitute in their Reputations, vicious in their
Lives, and ruin'd in their Fortunes, who to the shame of
good Sense as well as Piety, are greedily read, meerly
upon the Strength of bold, false, impious Assertions, mixt
with unmannerly Reflections upon the Priesthood, and
openly intended against all Religion; in short, full o f such
Principles as are kindly received, because they are levell'd
to remove those Terrors that Religion tells Men will be the
Consequence o f immoral Lives.
(Swift, Writings. 266)

The final words of the passage above are the most telling, if subtle. For what
works before this time have gone farthest in removing the "Terrors" wrought upon man
through religion and its threatening afterlife than those o f Lucretius and Hobbes? Both
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philosophers urge the tortured layman to embrace materialism, and with it the complete
death of body and soul at the moment o f human expiration, thereby rejecting the
commonly held ideas o f religion with its "unmannerly Reflections upon the Priesthood."
It is to this rebellious theory that the modem persona refers, and at which he will continue
to volley philosophical, and ultimately ineffectual, bombs. Maintaining later that indeed a
reply to or criticism o f one work (as his is to and of Leviathan) requires more talent and
perspiration than the writing of the piece in question, the author moves through
postscript and dedication until he arrives at his The Preface, in which he will explain, in a
rare moment of clarity, the purpose o f his tale.
Opening The Preface with an explanation of how his assignment came to be, the
persona reveals that "the Grandees of Church and State" were becoming quite alarmed at
the growing number of wits in society, and fearful that they would take it upon
themselves to "pick Holes in the weak sides of Religion and Government" (Swift, 284).
To avoid such widespread attack, continues our narrator, he himself was called upon to
provide a diversion for the wits, the model for which was bom o f certain maritime
practices:
Mean while the Danger hourly increasing, by new Levies of
Wits all appointed (as there is Reason to fear) with Pen, Ink, and
Paper which may at an hours Warning be drawn out into
Pamphlets, and other Offensive Weapons, ready for immediate
Execution: It was judged of absolute necessity, that some present
Expedient be thought on, till the main Design can be brought to
Maturity. To this End, at a Grand Committee, some days ago, this
important Discovery was made by a certain curious and refined
Observer; That Sea-men have a Custom when they meet a
Whale, to fling out an empty Tub, by way o f an Amusement, to
divert him from laying violent Hands upon the Ship. This Parable
was immediately mythologiz'd: The Whale was interpreted to be
Hobbes's Leviathan, which tosses and plays with all other Schemes
of Religion and Government, whereof a great many are hollow, and
dry, and empty, and noisy, and wooden, and given to Rotation, This
is the Leviathan from whence the terrible Wits o f our Age are said
to borrow their Weapons. The Ship in danger is easily understood
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to be its old Antitype the Commonwealth. ... And it was decreed, that
in order to prevent these Leviathans from tossing and sporting with
the Commonwealth, (which of it self is too apt to fluctuate) they should be
diverted from that Game by a Tale o f a Tub. And my Genius being
conceived to lye not unhappily that way, I had the Honor done me
to be engaged in the Performance.
(Swift, Writings. 284)

A Tale o f a Tub? then, is the literary distraction intended to deliver the standards
of Church and State from the predatory beast that is Leviathan, th e persona believes
that new philosophies such as those advanced by Hobbes will destroy the balance and
order o f England itself, and invites the reader to believe that his "Genius" alone will be
the means by which it is saved "till the main Design can be brought to Maturity." The
reader might expect, therefore, that the tale to follow will contain a consistent series of
facts and argument meant to debunk Hobbesian, and thereby in many ways Epicurean,
philosophy, along with efforts to reaffirm those tenets of Christianity and monarchy
believed to be in jeopardy. Instead, however, A Tale of a Tub is riddled with
contradictions, reversals, and nonsensical connections that leave the reader quite unsure
o f the persona's agenda, and perhaps certain only of the fact that his proclaimed goal in

The Preface has not been achieved.
One inconsistency displayed by the persona occurs quite early in the work, in
Section I. The Introduction. In attempting to explain that in order to maintain the
attention o f the public one must obtain a "superiour Position o f Place," the persona
reveals a weakness in his antipathy toward theories upsetting to the status quo by
employing one to explain that by "place" he does not mean social status or political
office, but literal physical placement above the public - - be it by pulpit, ladder, or stage:
FROM this accurate Deduction it is manifest, that for
obtaining Attention in Publick, there is o f necessity
required a superiour Position o f Place. But, altho'
this Point be generally granted, yet the Cause is little
agreed in; and it seems to me, that very few Philosophers
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have fallen into a true, natural Solution o f this Phenomenon.
The deepest Account, and the most fairly digested of
any I have yet met with, is this, That Air being a heavy
Body, and therefore (according to the System of Epicurus)
continually descending, must needs be more so, when
loaden and press'd down by Words. (Swift, Writings, 295)
Here, the champion o f all things modem has called upon the theories o f Epicurus to
explain and support his claim that height lends superiority. Further, there exists a note
within the text that gives Lucretius as the source used by the persona to discover that
"System of Epicurus ." The irony here is unmistakable; Lucretius, in extolling the merits
of Epicurean materialism - - looking only to the physical world to explain intangibles - has as well helped the persona explain his own "modem" ideas in a work aimed at
discrediting Hobbes's Leviathan, a work that itself is largely founded upon
Epicurean/Lucretian tradition. This irony does not bode well for the supposedly learned
persona. A student would undoubtedly be aware of the connection between Lucretius
and Hobbes, and the fact that the persona seems oblivious of it places in doubt his right
to be the creator o f the tub. He even goes as far as including two lines from Lucretius's
D e RerunLNatum:

Corporeum quoque enim vocem constare fatendum est,
Etsonitum, quoniampossuni impellere Sensus. Lucr.Lib.4.
'Tis certain then, that Voice that thus can wound
Is all Material; Body every Sound. (Swift, Writings, 295)
So, employing ancient and disruptive theory in his argument against it, the persona
launches his tub with one philosophical hole already in its side.
Leaving preliminary elements at last, the persona next moves to Section II, in
which he begins the story of the three brothers, Peter, Martin and Jack, whose persons
and lives represent the Catholic, Lutheran and Calvinist faiths cloaked in the allegory of
the temptations o f high fashion. The brothers quickly encounter conflict when, left alone
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after the death of their father, and acting against the wishes set forth in his will, they
invest in a new fashion (representing a new system of belief) and so embellish their simple
but pure coats of Christianity with rich ornaments. The sect to which the brothers are
attracted "held the Universe to be a large Suit o f Cloaths, which invests every Thing:
That the Earth is invested by the Air; The Air is invested by the Stars; and the Stars are

invested by the Primum Mobile" (Swift, Writings. 304). It is obvious that the storyteller
is disdainful o f such new systems o f belief, especially one which so obviously reduces the
world and its characteristics to a very materialistic model - - not unlike the efforts of
Lucretius and Hobbes to whom, in effect, he had referred to establish his own ideas in
Section I. While this new condemnation is consistent with the ostensible reasons for
writing the tale, the reader may find the obvious contradiction somewhat disconcerting.
The persona, however, takes measures throughout the remainder of Section II to adhere
to his main purpose. This is made quite clear when, at a moment in the allegory when
one of the brothers objects to a new and questionable interpretation of his father's will, he
is chastised by his siblings for looking too deeply into the "Mystery" of it;
However, he objected again ... upon which he was
taken up short, as one that spoke irreverently of a
Mystery, which doubtless was very useful and
significant, but ought not to be over-curiously pryed
into, or nicely reasoned upon. (Swift, Writings. 309)
Recalling that one of the main goals of Hobbes and Lucretius was to eliminate the
mysteries encouraged by religion and so free Man from the fear of what might happen to
him in the afterlife, this is a well - placed and subtle jab at those men, and also a
reinforcement o f the importance of credulity within the scheme of religion. It certainly
contributes to the protection o f the system for which he is writing. Perhaps somewhat
more confident that the "author" has found his true course, the reader is next invited into

20

A Digression Concerning CrHicks, wherein is examined the feud between the ancients
and the modems, and the true character o f the "critick" is revealed.
In his description o f critics, however, the persona again refers to the ancient
Lucretius to explain their poisonous effect on authors:

Est etiam in magnis Heliconis montibus arbos,
Floris odore hominem retro consueta necare. Lib. 6.
Near Helicon, and round the Learned Hill,
Grow Trees whose Blossoms with their Odour kill
(Swift, Writings. 315)
Once more, the man who claimed to be a student o f all things modem relies on his long
dead literary forefather to clarify his point ... a fact made all the more ironic by his
obvious ignorance o f the Lucretian origins o f the Leviathan he so detests.
Yet it is not until much later in A Tale o f a Tub, in Section IX A Digression

Concerning the Original, the Use and Improvement o f Madness in a Commonwealth,
that the persona attacks most energetically "the great Introducers o f new Schemes."
About such persons he writes the following:
Let us next examine the great Introducers of new Schemes in
Philosophy, and search till we can find, from what Faculty of
the Soul the Disposition arises in mortal Man, o f taking it into
his Head, to advance new Systems with such an eager Zeal, in
things agreed on all hands impossible to be known. ... Of this kind
were Epicurus, Diogenes, Apollonius, Lucretius, Paracelsus, Des
Cartes, and others; who, if they were now in the World, tied
fast, and separate from their Followers, would in this our indis
tinguishing Age, incur manifest Danger of Phlebotomy, and
Whips, and Chains, and dark Chambers, and Straw. For, what
Man in the natural State, or Course of Thinking, did ever conceive
it in his Power, to reduce the Notions of all Mankind, exactly to
the same Length, and Breadth, and Heighth of his own? ....
Epicurus, modestly hoped, that one Time or other, a certain
Fortuitous Concourse of all Mens Opinions, after perpetual
Justlings, the Sharp with the Smooth, the Light and the Heavy, the
Round and the Square, would by certain Clinamina, unite in the
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Notions o f Atoms and Void, as these did in the Originals o f all
Things.
(Swift, Writings, 348)

The success or failure o f such philosophies depends entirely upon luck, continues the
persona, luck in striking a sympathetic chord at the right time with the right persons,
who will then become disciples. Strike poorly, however, and you will be considered a
fool. The persona indeed attributes the success of Epicurean and other philosophies
(including those of Diogenes, Lucretius, and Des Cartes) to "my Phoenomenon o f

Vapours, ascending from the lower Faculties to over-shadow the Brain, and there
distilling into Conceptions, for which the Narrowness of our Mother-Tongue has not yet
assigned any other Name, besides that of Madness or Phrenzy" (Swift, 348). It can be
inferred, then, that the persona believes Epicurus, and so Hobbes, to be madmen. If this
be true, then, as suggested earlier, the persona is a madman as well; for in his own work
does he not attempt "to reduce the Notions of all Mankind, exactly to the same Length,
and Breadth, and Heighth o f his own"? Further, and perhaps more important, does this
not make him an ancient rather than a modem? In the course o f his tale, the persona has
lost his identity, and so arguably his credibility as a reliable source of criticism.
Yet, if he is mad, he goes further in this digression to argue against Hobbesian
materialism. Using satire as his weapon, the persona proceeds to reveal that material
explanations for spiritual concerns leave nothing more to the world of education than,
ironically, a void. He gives materialism a chance to explain the differences in men - those elements that create in one an Alexander the Great and in another a fool - - and the
reasons for madness:
*There is in Mankind a certain *
*
* * * * * * * *
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And this I take to be a clear
(Swift, Writings. 350)
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By making obvious the complete absence of the words that might have
illuminated the utility o f materialism, the persona brilliantly reveals the theory’s inability to
do so, leaving behind a trail o f atom-like asterisks in place o f philosophical information.
The persona uses this disproving of reason to launch a campaign in favor of the
imagination, offering that illusion rather than reality is the true road to happiness and
peace. Note the following passage in which the persona emphasizes the importance of
credulity over curiosity:
if it were not for the Assistance of Artificial
Mediums, false Lights, refracted Angles, Varnish, and
Tinsel; there would be a mighty Level in the Felicity and
Enjoyments o f Mortal Men.
(Swift, Writings. 351)
Whereas Lucretius claimed that the elimination of mystery would serve to bring all men
to a level with the gods, the brother o f Grub Street insists that the result will instead be a
levelling of happiness among them, who need the mystery, the omamenC, in order to
remain content. Reason, he concludes, is akin to curiosity, which itself is a destructive
force because it leads one beyond the surface, and away from the more peaceful and
desirable state of credulity - - a state scorned by Lucretius and Hobbes. It may then be
argued that Hobbes, so curious and insistent in exposing weakness and error in the
well - established institutions o f religion and government, is an enemy to oblivion, a state
that the modem persona desires passionately, and which, in another awesome irony, he
finds most commendable in the practices o f Epicurus:
He that can with Epicurus content his Ideas
with the Films and Images that fly off upon his Senses
from the Superficies o f Things; Such a Man truly
wise, creams off Nature, leaving the Sower and the
Dregs, for Philosophy and Reason to lap up. This is
the sublime and refined Point of Felicity, called, the
Possession o f being well deceived, The Serene Peaceful
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State of being a Fool among Knaves. (Swift, Writings. 352)
From this passage several conclusions can be extracted. First, the persona believes that
those who attempt to reason too often are conniving knaves, while those who accept the
superficial world are in the enviable position of being fools. Second, the practices of
Epicurus to which the persona refers as a model o f successful foolishness are his aesthetic
indulgences - - his attempts to enjoy life as much as possible through satisfaction of his
physical needs. This idea echoes the idea o f the persona as Hobbes's "sensual man," and
his appreciation for others o f his ilk. Third, the persona ignores, or worse is unaware,
that this contentment with "the Superficies of Things" stems from a deeply
revolutionary, not to mention ancient, theory that denies that man's soul moves on from
death to afterlife and, further, refuses to acknowledge any divinity in the creation of the
world, relying instead on atomism and materialism to explain those things conventionally
explained through the tenets o f religion. Thus, the entity that the persona so desires to
protect - - religion - - becomes a casualty o f his own philosophical concordance with his
professed enemy, Hobbes. Such irony makes clear that the persona has reached his own
ideal state. He is a credulous fool, uninterested in delving beneath the surface o f any
philosophy, including his own. As a result, throughout A Tale o f a Tub he often extols
out of ignorance the ideas against which he is meant to rage, and sinks, along with his
tub, into a sea o f madness.

m.

Study of the persona, however, does not automatically satisfy queries
about the author of A Tale o f a Tub, Jonathan Swift himself. There is a strange
relationship between Swift and the persona, while ostensibly they represent two diverse
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schools o f thought - - Swift the well established ancients, and the persona the evolving
moderns - - yet they share an odd kinship. In many ways, their differing styles and
opinions lead each to the same conclusion, and in this sense the Dean aligns himself with
the Grub Street fraternity more than perhaps he means to. Before the two are compared,
however, it is best to look briefly at the man behind the work in order to discover his own
ideas about the issues with which he deals in A Tale o f a Tub. The most effective means
o f doing so is to sketch Swift's general attitude toward religion, modernism, and the
status quo.
Swift's religious philosophy was relatively simple. He was an Anglican, and
deeply rooted in the Church of England. Nevertheless, he was Irish as well and during
his lifetime, which would eventually lead him to the Deanship of St. Patrick's in Ireland,
he was witness to tumultuous religious events there. Arguably, it was these events that
provided one of the major impulses to write the Tale. As Patrick Reilly explains in
Jonathan Swift : The Brave Desponder, Swift experienced a great deal of frustration
caused by certain restless Protestants:
Swift lived at Kilroot as Anglican divine surrounded
by Presbyterian descendents of Scottish settlers at
a time when Catholicism, however doctrinally re
pugnant, had ceased to be a political threat. The
Williamite settlement after Limerick ended for
centuries the possibility of a Catholic property owning class dominating Ireland and throughout the
island the Catholics were reduced to helpless, impover
ished servitude. The united Protestant front that had
beaten the Popish, Gaelic threat could now break into
its component parts, and in Ulster dissenters complained
they had overthrown papal absolutism only to make a
minority of Anglicans their new masters. Their grievances
aroused Swift's anger and contempt - - he retorted
sarcastically that he thought they had fought for the
religious freedom which they now enjoyed; but freedom
was apparently only the pretext to pursue power and
the overthrow of the established Church. (Reilly, 65)
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The last line of the passage above is of massive importance in understanding Swift's
philosophy. His belief that freedom will lead to zealotry and rebellion is a driving force
behind the tale's plot proper; three brothers who, after their father's death and against his
will, take advantage o f their liberty, manipulate the rules and eventually separate
completely in order to form three new and different religions. A Tale of a Tub is more
than a testament to the piety o f its author, it is also an expression of his need for stability
and the well tried lessons o f the past.
Jonathan Swift is an ancient, a student of that seventeenth - century school
which maintains that the only true models of literary excellence are the classics. Yet it
must be asked, does Swift consider Lucretius an ancient? The classic origins o f the latter
were surely acknowledged by Swift as "ancient" in the technical sense, yet he goes on to
at once attack him and use him to empower his own position in a frustratingly selective
series o f reactions. And although the persona is a satiric model o f the detestable
modem - - the writer who contests the sovereignty o f the ancient masters - - the two
can in fact be reconciled in one very important way: the ancient and the modem are
equally scornful o f curiosity.
In many ways, Swift immersed himself in the past - - namely the seventeenth century - - where he found for himself a comfortable place within a sea o f intolerance
(Reilly, 87). The impatience he harbored was especially reserved for new systems of
belief and those persons or groups who questioned the already established tenets of
religion and philosophy. Such a man was Thomas Hobbes who, with the help of
Lucretius, attempted to remove mystery (and so fear o f God) from the existence o f man.
Swift detested those who spurn inherited wisdom to seek new truths in morals and
religion, they are, as John Stuart Mill suggests, "dissentients afflicted with the malady of
thought, and society cannot survive when every man strives to become his own carver"
(Reilly, 120). The status quo will falter. Though this portrait is vastly different from that
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o f the modern persona, or any modem, still the two are rather closely allied. Swift
despises curiosity, and explores that detestation with a curiosity for which he has, of
course, given himself license, because it is a threat to the establishment and an invitation
to anarchy. And yet it cannot be denied that Swift displays an irresistible attraction to
chaos, especially in the way he writes the parody in A Tale o f a Tub. Note the following
analysis of this penchant by Claude Rawson:

The problem sometimes arises o f just where the
dominant focus lies: a parodic energy may blur a
more central intention, and there may be a hiatus
between a local parodic effect and the main drift
of the discourse ... The cumulative effect o f the
Tale’s formidable parodic array is to convey a
sense of intellectual and cultural breakdown so
massive and so compelling that the parodied
objects, as such, come to seem a minor detail.
(Rawson, 5)

Like Swift, the persona resents curiosity. However, his quarrel with it stems from
his insistence that, as discussed earlier, it is simply more enjoyable to be credulous, to live
with "the Assistance of Artificial Mediums, false Lights, refracted Angles, Varnish, and
Tinsel" is eminently more powerful than to exist tainted with the odious and complicated
nature of reason. The means are quite different, as are their causes, yet the result is the
same. In the ways o f both intellectual curiosity and political contentment with
superficiality it is clear that Swift can be identified with his own disrespectful model of a
modem.
Complicating the formula, however, is yet another Swiftean paradox. At the
same time that Swift condemns Hobbes, he subscribes to him in various subtle and
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unmistakable ways. Just as the persona uses Epicurean/Lucretian philosophy in his attack
against it, Swift’s writing accords with various aspects o f Hobbes’s work, most notably in
his personal letters and Gulliver’s Travels, which cast doubt on his supposed contempt for
new and, keeping in mind Hobbes's connection with Lucretius and Epicurus, old
philosophy. Swift seems to draw from and adhere to certain ideas o f Hobbes while he
vociferously condemns the rest o f them. If he was trapped in the seventeenth century,
Swift was in many ways stuck with Hobbes, an original to those one hundred years.
Having held correspondence with peers of renown equal to his own, including
Alexander Pope and John Gay, Swift was able to express to them his honest opinions on
most subjects. His feelings for mankind were no exception. In a letter to the Reverend
Thomas Sheridan, dated 11 September 1725, Swift explains to the recently disappointed
young man the following;

If you are indeed a discarded Courtier, you have reason to complain, but
none at all to wonder; you are too young for many Experiences to fall in your
way, yet you have read enough to make you know the Nature o f Man. It is safer
for a Man's Interest to blaspheme God, than to be of a Party out o f Power, or even
to be thought so .... expect no more from Man than such an Animal is capable of,
and you will every day find my Description o f Yahoes more resembling.
(Swift, Writings. 583-584)

The bitterness contained within these lines may well be attributed to Swift's own
negative experience at court. Nevertheless, he expresses unmistakably a contempt not
only for royals, but for the ’’Animal" that is man. At this time, Swift was undoubtedly
working on Gulliver's Travels, which would be released for circulation the following year.
His reference to "Yahoes," which would become the negative moniker for the humanlike
creatures in Book IV, emphasizes that Swift's opinion of humankind strongly reflected
Hobbesian ideas. This position is continually supported by evidence from later letters. In
one to Alexander Pope on 29 September 1725, Swift asserts,

28

principally I hate and detest that animal called man, although I hartily
love John, Peter, Thomas and so forth, this [sic] is the system upon which
I have governed my self many years. . .and so I shall go on until I have done
with them I have got Materials Towards a Treatis proving the falsity o f
that Definition animal rationale; and to show it should be only rationis
capax. Upon this great foundation of Misanthropy.. The whole building of
my Travells is erected.
(Swift, Writings, 584-585)
Here it is clear that it is not each man ("John, Peter, Thomas and so forth") in and of
himself that is the object of disgust. Rather it is the nature of mankind at which he volleys
his criticism. In this letter as well Swift declares unmistakably his intentions for Gulliver's
Travels: it is a "Treatis" based on that misanthropy which the author finds abundant in his
fellow man and, arguably, in himself. Swift, like Hobbes, reveals a quarrel with the idea
that men are fundamentally rational beings, and intends to prove his point in the story o f
Lemuel Gulliver. The commonly, and comfortably, held belief in human enlightenment by
the masses has long been denied by some philosophers. John Locke, in an attack on the
idea of human virtue as innate, selected several cultures in which seemingly universal
"rules" such as preservation of children are completely denied, he thus asserts that if the
most powerful, most basic moral principles can be ignored, then none can be innate
(Ehrenpreis, 20). Swift was no stranger to these ideas, and explored them in A Modest

Proposal as well as in personal correspondence and Gulliver's Travels. In yet another
letter from Swift to Pope on 26 November 1725 he writes, "I tell you after all that I do
not hate Mankind, it is vous autres who hate them because you would have them
reasonable Animals, and are Angry for being disappointed. I have always rejected that
Definition and made another of my own" (Swift, Writings, 586). In stating that because
mankind is not a reasonable race it cannot be held accountable for actions less than
honorable, Swift essentially robs society of its comfortable morality and labels it foolish.
To regard man as such in his letters is a relatively safe means o f expression; to make them
known as such in public writings, as Swift vowed he would, is to involve himself deeply in
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political and social controversy. The student of Swift will be aware that controversy was
a tempest from which he did not fly; and in Gullivers Travels he courts it most boldly,
allowing his own characteristics o f Hobbism to reveal themselves. Here, Swift uses the
many adventures o f Lemuel Gulliver to investigate freedom, selfishness, and human
nature, and to express an opinion that, though originating in the mind o f a "Church of
England Man," demonstrates a strong influence by Thomas Hobbes, and thereby
Epicurean/Lucretian tradition.
In Part I: A Voyage to Lilliput, Lemuel Gulliver begins his fantastic series of
journeys by finding himself, by the force o f nature, deposited on the shores o f Lilliput,
where he first glimpses the force o f his own nature. Upon awakening to find himself
bound by ropes, Gulliver immediately sets the tone of our and his own reactions to the tiny
people whom he discovers are his captors by constantly referring to them as "creatures."
The description of their movements, especially in terms of Gulliver's gigantic frame,
suggests an insect-like quality. Gulliver's immediate reaction, quite condescending in tone,
is followed directly by an animalistic instinct to lash out against his situation. Finding
himself under such odd conditions, and at the mercy of such incredible captors, Gulliver
describes his state o f mind in one of the first and best references to Hobbesian theory in
the entire piece:

I confess I was often tempted, while they were passing
backwards and forwards on my Body, to seize Forty or
Fifty o f the first that came in my Reach, and dash them
against the ground. But the Remembrance o f what I had
felt, which probably might not be the worst they could
do; and the Promise o f Honour I made them, for so I
interpreted my submissive Behaviour, soon drove out
those Imaginations. Besides, I now considered myself
bound by the Laws of Hospitality to a People who had
treated me with so much Expence and Magnificence.
(Swift, Writings, 8)
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Gulliver’s animalistic desire to harm the industrious yet annoying "creatures," the concern
he displays for his own safety, and his subsequent decision to submit to the "Laws" of
Lilliputian society in order to maintain it are Hobbesian enough on their own. The added
element, however, of the captive's knowledge of his own power and the likelihood of
success in its exercise completes the parallel to Hobbes's model o f the necessary contract
between men in order to survive. In Leviathan Thomas Hobbes offered a model of society
in which he asserted that concessions such as Gulliver's were necessary to tame the beast
in men and ensure a relatively peaceful coexistence. Take the following passage from
Part I: O fMan, Chapter XIV; O f the first and second Naturall Lawes, and o f Contracts,
which describes in words the theory o f society that brings Gulliver to his decision to
submit:

because the condition o f Man .. . is a condition
o f Warre of every one against every one; in which case
every one is governed by his own Reason ... it
followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a
Right to everything; even to one anothers body. And
therefore, as long as this naturall Right o f every man
to everything endureth, there can be no security to
any man ... And consequently it is a precept, or generall
rule o f Reason, That every man, ought to endeavour
Peace, as farre as he has hope o f obtaining it. (Leviathan, 189-190)

From what he calls the "Fundamentall Law o f Nature" to "seek Peace and follow

it," Hobbes derives the second "Law o f Nature,"

That a man be willing, when others are so too, as
farre-forth, as fo r Peace, and defence o f himselfe he
shall think itnecessary, to lay down his right to all things; and
be contented with so much liberty against other men, as
he would allow other men against himselfe. (Leviathan. 190)
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Upon this first encounter with the Hobbesian instinct in himself, Gulliver embarks
on a journey o f human discovery parallel with that o f the physical and intellectual. Later,
in Chapter III o f Book I, Gulliver is set free only by entering into contract with the rulers
o f Lilliput, a freedom questionable in definition, as we are told by the surgeon that he is
bound to certain "Articles and Conditions," the performance of which he was made to
swear "first in the Manner o f ... [his] own Country, and afterwards in the Method
prescribed by their Laws" (Swift, 25).
After his escape from Lilliput and upon his arrival in Brobdingnag in Part II,
Gulliver is transformed from the giant to the insect as he is taken in and ultimately
exploited by the enormous Brobdingnagians. Again, he is held captive, this time not by
chains, but by the frustrating knowledge that any attempt at rebellion or escape is
hopeless; and again he acknowledges his weakened position within his new society,
deciding ultimately that he must, in order to remain intact, submit to the wills and laws o f
Brobdingnagian society. In short, he must behave in a Hobbesian manner. Having
decided and acted upon this decision, Gulliver is given a kind o f liberty. He is certainly
treated well, even doted upon by the women o f the race, with his own governess and a
queen who becomes so fond of him "that she could not dine without" him. In the end,
however, Gulliver is treated as a curious house pet, compelled by the king to perform
various tricks, and endowed with a perspective that for the first time allows him to see
magnified the gross elements of the human body. This sort o f freedom is, like that he
experienced in Lilliput, o f questionable merit. In the first two voyages, Swift attempts to
disentangle the meaning and possibility of freedom in Gulliver's imprisonments, and finds
easy answers to his queries in Hobbes's simple notion that freedom is in essence the
absence of "external impediments;" for in both Lilliput and Brobdingnag it is easy to
discern, by this definition, when Gulliver is actually "free" (Reilly, 57-58). Having
willfully escaped from both countries, even after giving his word of honor to perform
certain duties, and becoming aware that his fate could have been much worse if not for the
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relative kindness o f both races o f captors, Gulliver has proven himself a good Hobbesian;
for he has, despite his contracts, allowed his self-preservation first priority, and acted in
such a way as to ensure it (Reilly, 22). Evidence for this assumption can be found in
countless passages o f Hobbes's Leviathan, most notably in Part II: O f Common - Wealth,
wherein he writes the following:

In relation to these Bonds only it is, that I am to
speak now, o f the Liberty o f Subjects. For
seeing there is no Common - wealth in the world,
wherein there be Rules enough set down for the
regulating o f all actions, and words of men, (as being
a thing impossible:) it followeth necessarily, that
in all kinds o f actions, by the laws praetermitted, men
have the Liberty, of doing what their own reasons
shall suggest, for the most profitable to themselves. (Leviathan, 264)

In essence, then, Gulliver is following the simple formula set out by Hobbes that allows
him to take action in preserving his own life, self-preservation is the first law of nature for
Hobbes, and it is a liberty granted under the idea o f the "voluntary” contract, which,
though necessary, is not in and o f itself the most important part o f man's existence. These
ideas o f freedom, so clearly defined in the first two voyages of Gulliver's Travels, become
more complex as Gulliver finds himself a prisoner not only to foreigners, but to the society
of his fellow men - - to humanity itself, which he has grown to associate with animal
brutality - - until at last he submits to the noble horses in Part IV: A Voyage to the

Country o f the Houynhnms.
Resigning himself to Houyhnhnm society, calling one o f its members "master,"
there is a strong indication that Gulliver is happy to enter into contract with the horses, is
almost relieved to be in a society o f what he thinks reasonable and enlightened creatures.
Having asserted to his master that his own country is run by Yahoos, Gulliver has as well
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acknowledged that his home is one governed by beasts, all o f whom may be considered
the culmination of every gross and dull-minded creature he has met during his four sea
voyages. The horses certainly live in harmony with one another; and the contrast between
them and the Yahoos, or humans, and the penchant o f that species for deceit as a means of
self-preservation is undeniably sharp both to Gulliver and the careful reader. Hobbes
addresses the subject o f dishonesty, in a passage in Leviathan about words and their
abuses, citing four main offenses: self-deception, deception o f others, false representation
o f one's will or desire, and the causing o f grief to others (Leviathan. 102). One can relate
the first two abuses directly to Gulliver; for he has until now deceived himself as to the
true nature o f man in his defense of his country and his purposeful concealment o f certain
unattractive elements of his own society - - this all during conversation with the curious
horses. Having, however, arrived into the company of creatures he thinks to be the zenith
of reason and truth, he is all too aware o f the differences in attitude concerning truth and
speech; to reinforce this contrast, his master tells him "That the Use o f Speech was to
make us understand one another, and to receive Information o f Facts; now if any one said

the Thing which was not, these Ends were defeated" (Swift, 207).
When finally exiled by the horses, Gulliver finds himself a changed man. Had he
remained himself throughout his travels, Gulliver would have been overjoyed to meet Don
Pedro, his saviour; for the kind mariner, who by virtue o f his deeds as well as his name,
easily translated "St. Peter," is arguably the only symbol of human goodness with which
Gulliver meets, and is indeed the very evidence that a more alert man might use to rebuild
some faith in humanity (though Gulliver does admit to Don Pedro's "Very good human
Understanding") (Swift, 253). But Gulliver is completely altered, and so too is his notion
of freedom; he no longer wishes to live in a society o f human beings, all of whom he now
considers Yahoos. Evidence o f this attitude, and o f Swift’s own cynicism, can be found by
looking again at the name of Gulliver's savior. For the last name o f Don Pedro (St. Peter)
is Mendez, a word which equates with the Spanish word for "liar," mendaz (Cassell's.
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418). In the Portuguese language, Mendez conies closest to the word for "beggar,"

mendigo (Basic Dictionary, 685). Such wordplay identifies Don Pedro as a lying saint,
and emphasizes Gulliver's deteriorating opinion of his fellow man - - even the kindest o f
souls, he believes, is somehow inherently unworthy o f trust. He has seen Hobbes's animal,
and wants never to return to so-called "civilized" society again. Interestingly, he does not
equate himself with the Yahoos of his world , and so it may be acknowledged, ironically,
that he himself has fulfilled the Hobbesian requirement o f narcissistic, self-preservating
savagery. Thus, Gulliver, the persona, becomes the object o f Swift's satire. Yet return he
must, and so Gulliver finds himself on the border o f his own jungle, once the England - the home - - he loved, and void of the love of humanity he possessed before his adventures
began.
Throughout Gulliver'sTravels there lay countless Hobbesian doors waiting to be
opened. Each lends itself to the decoding of Lemuel Gulliver's journey from peaceable
Englishman to hopeless misanthrope, a journey that Swift seems to share to the exclusion
of allowing himself to become that which he scorns (thus his selective use of arguments
and his gentle sojourns into hypocrisy). As Gulliver himself crosses each new threshold he
is drawn further and further away from the ideals of men like Don Pedro, and deeper into
the dark state of nature o f Thomas Hobbes. So often held captive by fetters, Gulliver is at
these times at his most blessed; for he remains unaware of the nature of man and the evils
which, so claims Hobbes and believes Swift, it embraces, thereby remaining at liberty for
intellectual and emotional optimism. His idealism and patriotism, however, cannot protect
him from what he comes to find as a harsh reality, the knowledge o f which will prevent his
ever living in peace with his fellow human beings again. Lemuel Gulliver has learned that
in the state of nature, reason and true liberty are impossible, "And the life of man, solitary,
poore, nasty, brutish, and short" (Leviathan. 186).
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Swift's works commonly attempt to introduce mankind to itself, most often
employing satire to create a looking glass which, when held up to the visage o f humanity,
reflects a being sometimes monstrous, and often ignorant. And while the ignorance
against which he rails is bom mainly o f new and untried systems of thought, some, such
as Thomas Hobbes's De Homine and Leviathan, find their origins in classical sources
which, as an ancient, Swift supposedly espoused. Ironically, Swift distorts his own
principles by using elements o f those ideas he detests to empower his argument. A Tale o f
a Tub was ostensibly written to contest Leviathan, a work which was odious to Swift
because o f its attempt to remove mystery from the minds of man. And yet in the first of
many ironies, Swift draws from Leviathan those characteristics that most conveniently
agree with his own ideas of the nature o f man, discarding the rest, many o f which find
their origins in the ideas o f ancients such as Epicurus and Lucretius. Further, the persona
o f A Tale of a Tub is a modem, content with the superficiality o f forms, and disdainful of
curiosity. He is everything, one assumes, that the ancient Swift is not. Still, in his writings
one finds countless traces of his own leanings toward the ideas of Hobbes, as well as
characteristics shared with the modem he so scorns. For Swift also robs man of his status
as animal rationale and, like the modem, urges him not to be curious, not to attempt to
remove from life its mysteries, and so its fears. It is the fear, Swift believes, that ensures a
peaceful coexistence among men. Further, a study o f Swift's letters and Gulliver's Travels
reveals a strong connection between the Dean and the Hobbist school o f thought. Though
he claims to rage against Leviathan, especially the tenets within it that seek to reassure and
embolden man as Lucretius and Epicurus did, he nevertheless agrees with Hobbes's
definition of man and his natural state. Cautioning friends to ''expect no more from Man
than such an Animal is capable of, and you will every day find my Description of Yahoes
more resembling" (Swift, 584), Swift echoes many of Hobbes's own observations, such as
that man is a selfish brute, is innately bad, and is consequently thrust into a common
contract with his kind. Such ironic and seemingly hypocritical similarities between Swift
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and Hobbes cast doubt on Swift's intentions - - especially those behind A Tale of a Tub.
Although expressly meant to debunk Leviathan, in reality A Tale of a Tub takes issue only
with those elements of Leviathan that Swift finds most threatening to his own philosophies
and those of the ancient school. Such selectivity reveals little about Swift's true opinion of
Hobbes. It is certain, however, that the entity that Swift finds most frightening is not
Hobbes's work, but the possibility of its accuracy.
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